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Abstract
It has been argued that metacognition and mindreading rely on the same cognitive processes (Carruthers in The opacity of 
mind: an integrative theory of self-knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011). It is widely accepted that mindreading 
is diminished among individuals diagnosed with autism (Brunsdon and Happé in Autism 18(1):17–30, 2014), however, little 
is known about metacognition. This study examined metacognition in relation to mindreading and autism using post-decision 
wagering. Results from a student sample showed negative associations between autism traits and metacognitive accuracy, 
and metacognitive reaction times and mindreading. These findings were replicated in a general population sample, providing 
evidence of a reliable association between metacognition, mindreading and autism traits. However, adults diagnosed with 
autism showed equivalent levels of metacognitive accuracy to age- and IQ-matched comparison participants, albeit only 
with an overall increase in meta-level processing time.
Keywords Autism · Metacognition · Mindreading · Post-decision wagering
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental condi-
tion characterised by the early onset of behavioural difficul-
ties in social communication, and restricted/repetitive behav-
iour and interests (American Psychiatric Association 2013). 
It is widely reported that, at the cognitive level, mindreading 
(the ability to attribute mental states to others; also known 
as theory of mind or mentalising) is diminished among indi-
viduals diagnosed with ASD (Brunsdon and Happé 2014). 
However, there is relatively little research focusing on meta-
cognition (the ability to attribute mental states to one’s self) 
among individuals with autism (Carruthers 2009).
This relative lack of research into metacognition in 
ASD is surprising for several reasons. First, from a practi-
cal/clinical perspective, metacognition plays a vital role in 
everyday self-regulation (especially in education/work set-
tings; Hacker et al. 2008; Nelson and Narens 1990; Schunk 
2008), allowing one to control their thoughts and behav-
iour efficiently. For example, knowing that we do not know 
something should lead us to communicate our uncertainty 
(Bahrami et al. 2010), or seek out new information (Metcalfe 
and Finn 2008; Metcalfe 2009). These skills are important 
when it comes to real world situations, such as those faced in 
education or work. In these situations, uncertainty may lead 
one to revise more for an exam or to ask their supervisor for 
more guidance so that they can perform their job success-
fully. This is particularly relevant for understanding ASD, 
given that people with this disorder tend to have difficulties 
with self-regulation (Gomez and Baird 2005; Jahromi et al. 
2013), under-achieve in education relative to what would be 
predicted based on general intelligence (Ohtani and Hisa-
saka 2018), and struggle to maintain long-term employment 
(Hendricks 2010; Shattuck et al. 2007).
Second, from a theoretical perspective, there remains 
a debate concerning the underlying cognitive processes 
involved in mindreading and metacognition. On the one 
hand, it has been proposed that mindreading and metacog-
nition rely on the same neurocognitive mechanism, and 
therefore metacognition (as well as mindreading) should 
be impaired in individuals with autism (Carruthers 2011). 
However, others have argued that mindreading and metacog-
nition rely on distinct processes (Nichols and Stich 2003). 
Given that mindreading is known to be diminished among 
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individuals with autism,1 the study of metacognition in ASD 
has the potential to contribute to theory-building in this area. 
For example, if mindreading and metacognition rely on the 
same neurocognitive mechanism it would be predicted that 
there would be a significant relation between individuals’ 
performance on mindreading and metacognition tasks. The 
argument of shared mechanisms would further be supported 
by evidence of diminished metacognitive ability among indi-
viduals with autism. If, however, a dissociation is found, this 
would oppose the argument that mindreading and metacog-
nition rely on the same processes and support the theories 
that suggest distinct or additional processes are at work.
Metacognition is assessed traditionally by asking indi-
viduals to make some form of judgement about their abil-
ity/performance. The closer the correspondence between a 
person’s judgement of their ability and their actual ability, 
the better a person’s metacognitive monitoring ability. Prob-
ably the most frequently used task is the classic Judgement 
of Confidence (JoC) task. In this task, participants make a 
cognitive-level (or “object-level”) judgement and then rate 
how confident they are that they have performed accurately. 
The extent to which participants’ confidence in the accuracy 
of their response corresponds to the actual accuracy of their 
response indicates their metacognitive accuracy.
To date, five studies have examined JoC among children/
adolescents with autism, four of which reported diminished 
metacognitive accuracy (Wilkinson et al. 2010; McMahon 
et al. 2016; Williams et al. 2018; Grainger et al. 2016), 
and one of which reported no significant between-group 
differences (Wojcik et  al. 2011). A further four studies 
have explored metacognition among adults with ASD, 
three finding metacognition to be undiminished (Wilkin-
son et al. 2010; Sawyer et al. 2014), one producing mixed 
results (Cooper et al. 2016), and one reporting a significant 
diminution of JoC accuracy among participants with ASD 
(Nicholson et al. 2019). From this limited number of stud-
ies, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions relating to 
metacognition as measured by JoC in adults with autism. 
One possibility is that metacognitive deficits in childhood 
are resolved by adulthood. Another possibility is that meth-
odological (or other) issues mask underlying deficits among 
adults with autism. Sawyer et al. for example, did not match 
groups for age or IQ. Furthermore, Cooper et al. suggest that 
their mixed results may have been due to the differences in 
object-level tasks rather than true metacognitive differences. 
Given these mixed results, further research is required to 
rectify the methodological issues and examine metacogni-
tion using object-level tasks where individuals with autism 
do not have specific deficits.
A more general issue to consider when interpreting 
results from studies of JoC accuracy in ASD is that such 
tasks rely on verbal reports of confidence. One potential 
difficulty with such verbal measures is that they rely on a 
subjective interpretation of “confidence”, which may vary 
across individuals in a way that is not measured in traditional 
JoC tasks (Sandberg et al. 2010). Although there are good 
reasons to employ verbal tasks as measures of metacogni-
tive ability (see Nicholson et al. 2019), it would beneficial to 
explore other types of tasks to avoid over-reliance on a single 
measure. An alternative measure of metacognition that has 
never been employed among individuals with ASD to our 
knowledge, is post-decision wagering (PDW). PDW is a tan-
gible measure and has been used as an alternative to making 
verbal judgements of confidence in studies involving adults 
and children (Ruffman et al. 2001; Persaud et al. 2007). 
PDW is similar to JoC in that participants are required to 
make a cognitive-/object-level judgement, but instead of rat-
ing their confidence they place a bet on the accuracy of their 
judgement. The extent to which participants make higher 
wagers for correct responses and lower wagers for incorrect 
responses is taken to indicate their metacognitive ability. 
Research has also shown PDW to be as effective at measur-
ing metacognition, providing that the impact of risk aver-
sion is controlled for (Dienes and Seth 2010). Risk aversion 
has been linked to the way that individuals wager regardless 
of their level of confidence. For example, individuals may 
wager low to avoid large losses regardless of their level of 
confidence. To address this, we included a standard measure 
of risk aversion in the current study.
To date there are no published studies using PDW to exam-
ine metacognition in relation to ASD. Given the potential ben-
efits of PDW, the current study used a classic PDW task to 
investigate metacognition, and its relation to ASD and min-
dreading, in adult populations. In Experiment 1, we adopted 
an individual differences approach and explored the relations 
among metacognition, mindreading, and ASD traits in the gen-
eral population. In Experiment 2, we employed a case–control 
design, to investigate metacognition and mindreading among 
adults with autism, as well as typically developing (TD) adults 
matched for age, IQ, and risk aversion. We used both metacog-
nitive accuracy and metacognitive reaction times as measures 
of metacognition. Using metacognitive reaction times along-
side metacognitive accuracy allows us to examine if individu-
als with autism/more autism traits take longer to make their 
metacognitive decisions. It is important to use both measures 
1 The authors acknowledge that there is an ongoing debate among 
individuals who have been diagnosed with ASD concerning the ter-
minology used when referring to individuals with such a diagno-
sis. This article uses ‘individuals with autism’, however the authors 
acknowledge that some individuals diagnosed with ASD prefer to be 
referred to as ‘autistic’. Due to the ongoing debate, the authors have 
chosen to use ‘individuals with autism’ in line with the majority of 
research literature, however it is acknowledged that ‘autistic’ may be 
preferable to some people and therefore the authors do not mean to 
cause any offence with the terminology used within this article.
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because, whilst adults with ASD may be equally as accurate, 
it is possible they are slower at making meta-level decisions. 
If there is a difference in metacognitive reaction times (inde-
pendent of “object-level” reaction times) then it is possible 
that individuals with autism are using more effort and/or using 
a different process to reach levels of accuracy equal to TD 
individuals (Williams et al. 2009; Frith 2013; Bowler 1992). 
Based on previous research and in line with the one mecha-
nism account, we predicted that metacognitive accuracy and 
metacognitive reaction times (i.e., average time taken to make 
a PDW, as an indicator of uncertainty) would be associated 
significantly with both number of ASD traits (higher ASD 
traits = lower accuracy and slower reaction times) and min-
dreading ability (higher mindreading = higher accuracy and 
faster reaction times), independent of perceptual/object-level 
accuracy and reaction times.
Experiment 1: Method
Participants
Thirty-nine students (30 females) from the University of 
Kent took part in the experiment. Participants had a mean 
age of 19.10 years (SD 0.85; range = 18–21). Participants 
received course credits in partial fulfilment of their degree. 
Both experiments in the current article were ethically 
approved by the University of Kent’s Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee (201715120681034775) and informed 
consent was obtained prior to commencing the tasks. All 
participants were debriefed following each session.
Materials, Procedure and Scoring
Wagering Task
This task was implemented using PsychoPy (Peirce 2007). 
There were two phases to the task, the Perceptual Judgement 
Phase and the Wagering Phase (see Fig. 1).
Perceptual Judgement (Object‑Level) Phase
During this phase, participants were shown a series of 
images made up of dots (50 trials) on a computer screen. 
Participants were presented with two images on each trial 
and asked to identify which image had the most dots by 
clicking on the image using the mouse. The difficulty of 
the perceptual discrimination varied randomly across trials. 
Trial difficulty was operationalised in terms of the relative 
difference in the number of dots present in each of the two 
images. For example, a trial on which image A had 95 dots 
and image B had 125 dots (a proportional difference of .24) 
would be easier than a trial on which image A had 114 dots 
and image B had 120 dots (a proportional difference of .05). 
On each trial, participants had four seconds to make their 
judgement. If they had not made their judgement after four 
seconds, the programme moved on to the next trial and the 
trial was counted as a “miss”. The proportion of trials on 
which a correct perceptual discrimination was made was 
used as one dependent variable. The average time it took 
participants to make their judgment was used as the second 
dependent variable. The quicker the discrimination response, 
the easier participants found it to make their judgement.
Wagering Phase
On each trial, after making their perceptual judgement, par-
ticipants were asked to place a wager on their answer. Par-
ticipants indicated how many counters they wished to bet 
by using a five-point scale. Participants were informed at 
the beginning of the task that if they correctly identified the 
image with the most dots then (a) they won back the coun-
ters they wagered plus one for every counter they wagered 
and (b) got to keep the counters that they did not bet. So, for 
example, if a participant bet three counters and their answer 
was correct they received the three counters they bet, plus 
three more and got to keep the two they had left over (thus, 
eight counters in total). If the participant bet three counters 
Fig. 1  Example trial in the 
wagering task
Perceptual Judgement Phase - Participants had 4 
seconds to select the image with the most dots.
Wagering Phase - Participants took as long as 
they needed to place a wager on their perceptual 
judgement being correct. 
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and their answer was incorrect, they lost the counters they 
wagered but got to keep the counters they had left over (i.e., 
if they bet three of the five counters they received two coun-
ters in total). Participants were not told how much they had 
won until all trials were complete. Participants could win 
up to 500 counters. Participants were informed that the top 
three people with the most counters at the end of the study 
would receive a prize (1st = prize worth £20, 2nd = prize 
worth £10 and 3rd = prize worth £5). Prior to commencing 
the trials participants completed 10 practice trials.
“Meta-level” performance was indexed in each partici-
pant by calculating a gamma correlation (Kruskal and Good-
man 1954) between perceptual discrimination accuracy and 
number of counters wagered, providing a measure of meta-
cognitive accuracy. This measure has been recommended 
by Nelson (1984), and Nelson et al. (2004) and has been 
extensively used in research on metacognitive monitoring 
processes (e.g. Grainger et al. 2016; Sawyer et al. 2014; 
Williams et al. 2018). Use of gamma in the current study 
also serves to facilitate comparisons with other studies 
of metacognition in ASD, which have almost exclusively 
employed gamma as the main dependent variable. Meta-
cognitive accuracy ranges from − 1 to + 1 with scores of 0 
indicating chance level accuracy, and large positive scores 
indicating good metacognitive accuracy. “Meta-level” per-
formance was also indexed by the average time it took for 
participants to place their bet across trials. The quicker 
the wagering response, the easier participants found it to 
make their judgement. One participant was excluded from 
all analysis because there was no variation in their wagers 
across trials and so a gamma score could not be calculated 
(leaving n = 39).
Background Measures
Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001a). 
The AQ is a widely-used and well-validated self-report 
measure of ASD traits. It is considered to be a reliable 
measure of ASD traits in both clinical and subclinical pop-
ulations. The AQ presents participants with 50 individual 
statements (e.g., “I find social situations easy”) and partici-
pants were asked to decide the extent to which they agreed 
with each statement by responding on a 4-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “definitely agree” to “definitely disagree”. 
Higher scores indicate more ASD traits, with a maximum 
possible score of 50.
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMIE; Baron-
Cohen et  al. 2001b). The RMIE task is a widely used 
measure of mindreading among intellectually able adults, 
including those with ASD. The task involves looking at 
photographs of eyes and deciding what the person in the 
picture is feeling. Participants were presented with 36 eye 
stimuli and were required to select an emotion that best 
described what the person in the picture may be feeling 
out of four possible emotions. Scores ranged from 0 to 36 
with higher scores indicating better mindreading abilities.
It should be noted that the RMIE has been character-
ized reasonably as a kind of empathy/emotion recogni-
tion task, rather than a mindreading task specifically (see 
Oakley et al. 2016; but also see Nicholson et al. 2018). 
Yet, the task requires participants to select the most appro-
priate mental-state descriptor to explain the expression 
of a target agent, which appears to be a prima facie exam-
ple of mindreading. The task has been employed in over 
250 studies, and shows good test–retest reliability (e.g., 
Fernández-Abascal et  al. 2013), clearly distinguishes 
groups of participants with and without ASD (e.g., Wilson 
et al. 2014), is associated with the number of ASD traits 
shown by individuals in large population studies (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen et al. 2001b), and is correlated with other 
measures of mindreading even after the influence of IQ is 
controlled statistically (e.g., Jones et al. 2018). Nonethe-
less, we appreciate the alternative views of the basis of the 
RMIE task and also that mindreading is a multi-faceted 
ability that may not be tapped by any single task. There-
fore, we included additional measures of mindreading in 
both experiments 1 and 2.
Animations task (Abell et al. 2000). The Animations task 
has been widely used to assess mindreading abilities in both 
the general population and those diagnosed with ASD. Dur-
ing this task, participants were required to watch four short 
video clips of two triangles moving around. The clips were 
presented on a computer screen and, after watching each 
clip, participants were asked to describe what they thought 
was happening in the video. Participants were allowed to 
watch each clip twice and responses were recorded using 
an audio recorder and later transcribed. Accurate responses 
required participants to attribute mental states, such as desire 
and intention, to the two triangles. Scores ranged from 0 to 2 
for each clip, with higher scores indicating better mindread-
ing abilities. Participants completed one practice trial prior 
to commencing the test trials. Inter-rater reliability across all 
clips was excellent according to Cicchetti’s (1994) criteria 
(intra-class correlation = .89).
Risk Aversion tasks
Lottery questions (Dienes and Seth 2010). Participants were 
asked two lottery questions that were as follows:
• If there was a lottery for a £10 prize, which will be given 
to one of the 10 ticket holders, how much would you pay 
for a ticket?
• If the prize were £100, which will be given to one of the 
10 ticket holders, how much would you pay for a ticket?
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The smaller the amount an individual is willing to pay the 
lesser the individual’s propensity for risk, with an optimal 
score of 11 indicating no risk aversion. The lottery score for 
our sample was not significantly different from 11, indicat-
ing that our sample was not risk averse, t(37) = .04, p = .972.
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al. 2002). 
The BART is a computer-based task designed to measure 
risk propensity. In this task participants were required to 
inflate a computer-simulated balloon by pressing the space 
bar. In the current study, participants earned virtual money 
with each pump, which was later converted into points 
(£1 = 1 point) and added on to their score on the wager-
ing task. The amount earned in each trial was displayed on 
the screen with the total amount earned being presented 
throughout. When the balloon was pumped up too much, 
resulting in it exploding, participants did not gain anything 
for that trial. Participants were able to cease pumping the 
balloon at any point and bank the gains earned for that trial 
adding it to the total earnings. There were 20 trials in total. 
The smaller the average score for unexploded balloons the 
lower the individual’s propensity for risk. Descriptive sta-
tistics for each of the background and risk measures are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Statistical Analysis
Reported significance values are for two-tailed tests. How-
ever, when results are predicted a priori on the basis of a 
solid theoretical foundation and/or previous empirical find-
ings, it is arguably not only legitimate to use one-tailed tests, 
but also sensible to do so (see Cho and Abe 2013). In the 
current study, predictions were entirely in keeping with those 
made in our previous work on this topic and with published 
findings. Therefore, in instances where explicitly predicted 
results were non-significant when reported using two-tailed 
tests, but significant (or very close to being significant) when 
used one-tailed tests, we report the results from both. Where 
t-tests were used, we report Cohen’s d values as measures 
of effect size (≥ .0.20 = small effect, ≥ 0.50 = moderate 
effect; ≥ 0.80 = large effect; Cohen 1969). Where ANO-
VAs were used, we report partial eta squared (ƞp2) values as 
measures of effect size (≥ .01 = small effect, ≥ .06 = moder-
ate effect, ≥ .14 = large effect; Cohen 1969).
Experiment 1: Results
Descriptive statistics for the wagering task are presented in 
Table 2. The gamma score on the wagering task was signifi-
cantly different from zero, t(38) = 5.50, p < .001, indicating 
that participants were significantly above chance in their 
wagering accuracy, placing higher bets for correct answers 
than for incorrect answers. Table 3 shows non-parametric 
correlations among the key variables.2
As predicted, AQ score was significantly negatively 
associated with gamma. Partial correlation analysis showed 
that this association remained significant even after control-
ling for proportion of correct object-level discriminations, 
r(36) = − .34, p = .04. In contrast to what was predicted, 
AQ score was not significantly related to wagering reaction 
times (RT; seconds). In terms of mindreading, RMIE was 
significantly negatively associated with wagering RT. This 
correlation remained significant even after controlling for 
object-level RT, r(36) = − .41, p = .01.
Table 1  Means and standard deviations for background and risk 
measures in Experiment 1
Variable Mean SD Range
Autism Quotient 16.31 6.22 2–27
Animation 6.34 1.44 2–8
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 25.62 5.11 16–34
Balloon Analogue Risk Task 21.85 10.71 5–39
Lottery 11.05 9.18 0–55
Table 2  Means and standard deviations for the wagering task in 
Experiment 1
Variable Mean SD Range
Object-level proportion correct .66 .07 .56 to .80
Missed trials 1.10 1.47 0 to 5
Object-level reaction times (s) 1.87 0.39 1.20 to 2.64
Counters wagered 2.78 0.71 1.00 to 4.44
Wagering reaction times (s) 1.60 0.39 1.00 to 2.83
‘Meta-level’ gamma .29 .33 − .43 to 1
2 Due to the unequal number of males and females within this sam-
ple, analysis was conducted to examine if there was any significant 
difference between males and females on key variables. This analy-
sis showed that there was a significant difference for average wager 
(t(37) = 4.15, p < .001, d = 0.41), with males (M = 3.5; SD = .51) 
placing higher wagers than females (M = 2.6; SD = .62), and propor-
tion correct (t(37) = −  2.67, p = .0, d = 0.17), with females (M = .68; 
SD = .06) getting a higher proportion of answers correct compared 
to males (M = .61; SD = .06). Analysis also showed that there was 
a marginally significant difference between males and females for 
RMIE (t(37) = −  1.97, p = .06, d = 0.74), with females (M = 26.47; 
SD = 4.89) scoring higher than males (M = 22.78; SD = 5.07). All 
remaining variables, including gamma, were non-significant (all 
ts < 1.05, all ps > .30). Analysis was also conducted to ensure that 
there were no significant differences in correlations between gamma 
scores or wagering RT and mindreading (RMIE, Animations) or 
Autism traits (AQ). This analysis showed that there were no signifi-
cant differences between males and females for any of the correla-
tions according to Fisher’s Z test, all zs < − 1.61, all ps > .11.
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Experiment 1: Discussion
As predicted, the results from Experiment 1 showed that 
there was a significant relation between metacognitive accu-
racy and ASD traits, indicating that the more ASD traits an 
individual had the less accurate they were in their metacog-
nitive judgements. Unexpectedly, there was no significant 
relation between mindreading ability and metacognitive 
accuracy. However, as predicted, there was a significant rela-
tion between wagering RT and mindreading as measured 
by the RMIE task. The better the participant’s mindreading 
ability, the quicker they made their wagering judgements, 
independent of object-level RT. This implies that those 
with better mindreading skills are able to access metacog-
nitive processing and interpret it quicker, and thus arrive at 
a wagering decision with relative ease. It should be noted, 
however, that wagering RT was non-significantly associated 
with performance on the Animations task. This could be due 
to the relatively limited variance in scores on the Animations 
task (0–8, rather than 0–36 on the RMIE task) masking an 
underlying association. To address these issues in Experi-
ment 2, we employed a measure of mindreading with a wider 
range of scores than is possible on the Animations task (the 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; Dziobek 
et al. 2006). From these results, it was predicted that the 
ASD participants would show significantly lower wagering 
accuracy and significantly longer wagering RT than TD par-
ticipants in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: Method
Participants
Twenty-one adults with a diagnosis of ASD (13 males) and 
20 TD (14 males) adults took part in the current study. All 
of the participants in the ASD group had received a formal 
diagnosis of ASD in accordance with established criteria 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013; World Health 
Organization 1993).
Details of participant characteristics can be seen in 
Table 4. Full Scale (FSIQ), Verbal (VIQ) and Performance 
(PIQ) IQ were assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale for Intelligence-II (Wechsler 1999). All participants 
also completed the AQ as a measure of ASD traits and the 
BART as a measure of risk aversion. Thirty-nine participants 
also completed the Lottery questions; the remaining two (1 
ASD, 1 TD) did not due to administration error. Participants 
in the ASD group also completed the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule, a semi-structured observational 
measure of ASD features (Lord et al. 2000). Finally, all par-
ticipants completed two measures of mindreading ability, the 
RMIE task and the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cog-
nition (MASC; Dziobek et al. 2006), which is described in 
detail below. There were no significant differences between 
the ASD and TD group in terms of age, propensity for risk, 
FSIQ, VIQ, or PIQ. There were, however, expected between-
group differences in number of ASD traits (in line with their 
diagnostic status) and mindreading ability. Informed consent 
was obtained prior to commencing the tasks. All participants 
received payment of £7.50 per hour for their time and travel 
expenses, and all participants were debriefed following each 
session.
Materials, Procedure and Scoring
Participants completed the AQ, RMIE, BART, lottery and 
wagering task all of which are described above. The proce-
dures for AQ, RMIE and lottery were the same as in Experi-
ment 1, although the BART involved earning money instead 
of points in Experiment 2. Participants also completed the 
MASC where they watched a short film of a group of people 
interacting. The film was stopped at regular intervals and the 
participant was asked a question about what the person in 
the film was thinking or feeling at the moment the film was 
stopped. Each question was multiple choice and participants 
Table 3  Correlations between 
key variables in Experiment 1
*p < .05, **p < .01
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Object-level proportion correct − .30 − .19 − .36* − .01 − .29 .19 .40* .14 − .38*
2. Counters wagered − .04 .02 .04 .17 − .07 − .18 .15 .06
3. Object-level reaction times .55** .22 − .13 − .14 .02 .13 .32
4. Wagering reaction times .11 .17 − .18 − .33* .04 .30
5. ‘Meta-level’ gamma − .32* .13 − .04 − .05 .27
6. Autism Quotient − .16 − .21 − .24 .20
7. Animation .43** − .21 .01
8. Reading the Mind in the Eyes − .20 − .26
9. Balloon Analogue Risk Task − .16
10. Lottery
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were presented with four answers to choose from. The higher 
the score on the MASC the better the individual’s mindread-
ing abilities. The MASC also includes six control questions 
that require mental flexibility and abstract reasoning without 
any demand on social-cognitive competencies.
The wagering task had a similar procedure and scoring 
method as that used in Experiment 1, with only slight differ-
ences in each phase. In the Judgement Phase, approximately 
half of the participants in each group completed the same 
perceptual discrimination task (the dots task) as partici-
pants completed in Experiment 1. However, the other half 
of participants in each group completed an analogous task 
that involved choosing on each trial which of two lines was 
longest (rather than which of two boxes had the most dots 
in). The reason for this is that some participants had already 
completed the dots task as part of another study in our lab. 
To ensure there were no systematic differences between 
tasks across groups, an initial two-way ANOVA was con-
ducted. Main effects showed that there was a significant 
main effect of task version, F(1,37) = 5.22, p = .03, ƞ2 = .12, 
but not group, F(1,37) = .38, p = .54, ƞ2 = .01. The task main 
effect indicates that participants who took part in the lines 
version correctly discriminated a higher proportion (.71) in 
comparison to the dots task (.65). Crucially, the analysis 
confirmed that there was no significant Group × Task version 
interaction on the proportion of stimuli correctly discrimi-
nated, F(1,37) = 0.11, p = .72, ƞ2 = .003.
In the Wagering Phase, the only difference in procedure 
in Experiment 2 from that in Experiment 1 was that money 
was offered instead of prizes. Hence, in Experiment 2, the 
number of counters participants bet was equal to the number 
of pennies they wish to bet, 1 counter = 1p, 2 counters = 2p 
and so on. One participant (with ASD) was excluded from 
all analysis because there was no variation in the amount 
they wagered across trials and so a gamma score could not 
be calculated. This resulted in a final ASD sample of n = 21.
Experiment 2: Results
With regard to object-level performance, there were no sig-
nificant differences between participants with ASD (M = .67, 
SD = .08) and comparison participants (M = .68, SD = .09) 
in the proportion of trials on which stimuli were correctly 
discriminated, t(39) = − 0.44, p = .66, d = 0.12. Moreover, 
there was no significant difference between the ASD group 
(M = 2.09, SD = .44) and TD group (M = 2.02, SD = .42) 
in the average number of seconds to make their percep-
tual judgement during the object-level phase, t(39) = 0.48, 
p = .64, d = 0.16. Thus, the two groups were very similar 
with respect to cognitive-/object-level ability (accuracy and 
speed).
In the wagering phase, there was no significant differ-
ence between the ASD group (M = 3.03, SD = .96) and TD 
group (M = 3.31, SD = 1.08) in number of counters wagered, 
t(39) = − .91, p = .37, d = 0.27. This confirms the findings 
from the BART and lottery tasks (see Table 2) that partici-
pants with ASD were not inherently more risk averse than 
comparison participants. Unexpectedly, the mean gamma 
score among participants with ASD (M = .37, SD = .26) 
was non-significantly smaller than the gamma score among 
TD participants (M = .44, SD = .29), t(39) = − .76, p = .45, 
d = 0.25. However, as expected, the mean wagering RT was 
significantly longer among participants with ASD (M = 2.09, 
SD = .43) than among TD participants (M = 1.83, SD = .36), 
t(39) = 2.08, p = .04, d = 0.66. This remained significant (and 
Table 4  Experiment 2 
participant characteristics: 
means, standard deviations 
(in brackets), and inferential 
statistics
Group t p Cohen’s d
ASD (n = 21) TD (n = 20)
Age 36.86 (12.22) 41.95 (13.94) − 1.25 .22 0.39
Full-scale IQ 105.62 (13.18) 105.65 (12.99) − 0.01 .99 < 0.01
 Range 73–122 83–132
Performance IQ 106.14 (16.87) 105.60 (15.18) − 0.09 .93 0.04
 Range 65–132 76–141
Verbal IQ 105.38 (11.45) 104.05 (11.22) 0.38 .71 0.12
 Range 86–128 81–129
Autism Quotient 33.00 (8.20) 14.25 (4.56) 8.99 < .001 2.82
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 24.95 (5.35) 27.80 (3.86) − 1.95 .06 0.61
Movie for the Assessment of 
Social Cognition—Total
28.10 (6.58) 33.75 (5.21) − 3.04 < .001 0.95
Movie for the Assessment of 
Social Cognition—Control
3.43 (1.29) 4.40 (1.06) − 2.60 .01 0.81
BART 20.17 (9.24) 25.46 (12.36) − 1.56 .13 0.48
Lottery 11.89 (24.14) 5.97 (4.30) 1.01 .29 0.36
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increased somewhat in magnitude) after controlling for 
object-level RT, F(1,38) = 6.70, p = .01, ƞp2 = .15.
Correlations
To examine the relationship between ASD traits (AQ), meta-
cognition and mindreading (RMIE and MASC) a series of 
correlational analyses were conducted among each group. 
In the ASD group, there were no significant correlations 
between wagering RT or gamma, and mindreading or ASD 
traits, all rs < .28, all ps > .22. However, in the TD group, 
results replicated closely those observed in Experiment 1.
There was a negative correlation between AQ score and 
gamma among TD participants, rs(19) = − .42. This correla-
tion was close to statistical significance when using a two-
tailed test, p = .07 and statistically significant when using a 
one-tailed test, p < .04 (which is arguably legitimate, given 
that it was a predicted effect). In this context, it is important 
to note that this correlation is actually slightly stronger than 
the AQ score × gamma correlation observed among TD par-
ticipants in Experiment 1 (r = − .32 in Exp. 1 vs r = − .42 in 
Exp. 2), albeit non-significantly so according to Fisher’s Z 
test, z =0.39, p = .35. This suggests that the failure to reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance (when using a 
two-tailed test) was the result of the lower statistical power 
in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. Likewise, after con-
trolling for object-level performance (proportion correct), 
the AQ score × gamma correlation in Experiment 2 was 
non-significant when using a two-tailed test, rs(17) = − .37, 
p = .12, but marginally significant when using a one-tailed 
test, p = .06. Again, the partial AQ score × gamma correla-
tion in Experiment 2 was slightly stronger than the equiva-
lent partial correlation in Experiment 1 (r = − .34 in Exp. 
1 vs r = − .37 in Exp. 2). All other analyses examining the 
relationships between gamma scores and mindreading for 
the TD group were non-significant, all rs < .17, all ps > .24.
In terms of wagering RT, among TD participants, there 
was a significant negative correlation between wagering RT 
and performance on the MASC, rs(18) = − .73, p < .001. 
This remained significant when controlling for object-
level RT, rs(17) = − .73, p < .001 and proportion correctly 
discriminated, rs(17) = − .69, p < .001. All other analyses 
examining the relationships between wagering RT, and min-
dreading (RMIE) and ASD traits were non-significant, all 
rs < − .14, all ps > .55.
Due to the relatively small sample sizes across the two 
experiments we combined the student sample from Experi-
ment 1 and the TD sample from Experiment 2 (n = 59) to 
increase statistical power. Post hoc analysis using G*Power 
3.1 (Faul et  al. 2007) revealed the statistical power for 
detecting a medium effect size (.3) for the combined sam-
ples was .77. The combined sample analysis revealed that 
the significant negative correlation between AQ score and 
gamma (rs(59) = − .32, p = .01) remained significant when 
controlling for object-level performance (proportion cor-
rect), rs(56) = − .31, p = .01. There remained no significant 
correlation between gamma and RMIE, rs(59) = .05, p = .36. 
Combining the data also showed that there was a margin-
ally significant negative relationship between wagering RT 
and RMIE, rs(59) = − .21, p = .06 (which was significant of 
reported using a one-tailed test, p = .03), but the relationship 
between wagering RT and AQ score for the combined sam-
ples remained non-significant, rs(59) = .10, p = .22.
Experiment 2: Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 revealed that there was no 
significant difference in metacognitive accuracy between 
the ASD group and the TD group, in contrast to what was 
predicted. There was, however, a significant between-group 
difference in meta-level reaction time. This suggests that the 
ASD group may be using a different process, which requires 
additional processing time, to reach the same level of meta-
cognitive accuracy as the TD group. The significant associa-
tion between metacognitive accuracy and autism traits found 
in Experiment 1 was replicated among the TD group in 
Experiment 2. Furthermore, the relationship between mind-
reading and meta-level reaction times found in Experiment 1 
was replicated in the TD group (as measured by the MASC). 
This suggests that individuals with poorer mindreading abili-
ties took longer to make a metacognitive decision.
General Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate meta-
cognition in relation to ASD and mindreading using PDW. 
The key results were that ASD traits were significantly 
related to metacognitive accuracy (more ASD traits = lower 
accuracy) and mindreading ability was associated signifi-
cantly with metacognitive RT (better mindreading = faster 
RTs). These results, which we interpret below, should lead 
to the prediction that adults with a full diagnosis of ASD 
would show impairments in both measures of metacogni-
tive performance (accuracy and RTs). In keeping with this 
prediction, wagering RTs were significantly longer among 
ASD participants than among TD participants in Experiment 
2. In both experiments, these significant associations with 
meta-level performance (RTs and accuracy), were independ-
ent of the influence of object-level performance, showing 
the associations are specific to metacognitive, rather than 
cognitive, processes. In other words, it was not the case that 
decision-making, motor co-ordination, or general speed of 
processing were relatively slow among ASD participants, 
rather that metacognitive decision-making specifically was 
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diminished in this sample. Perhaps most important, this pat-
tern of associations was found in independent samples of TD 
adults across two experiments, which provides reassurance 
about the reliability of results.
Contrary to our prediction, however, there was no evi-
dence of an ASD-specific impairment in metacognitive 
accuracy in Experiment 2. The between-group difference in 
wagering accuracy was non-significant and associated with 
only a small effect size (d = 0.24). This is puzzling, given 
the reliable association between the number of ASD traits 
and metacognitive accuracy in the general population. Logi-
cally, if we find a relation between variables A and B in a 
sample of individuals with high/clinically-significant ASD 
traits, then this might not necessarily hold among people 
with lower ASD traits, or for the general population in which 
high AQ scores are apparent in a small proportion of indi-
viduals. However, if the A–B correlation is reliable in the 
general population (which it is in our study), then it should 
hold in diagnosed individuals who have high ASD traits by 
definition. There are two possible explanations for this pat-
tern of results, as far as we can deduce.
First, it could be that Experiment 2 was underpowered 
and that a larger sample of participants would have yielded 
a significant between-group difference in metacognitive 
accuracy. This is possible, of course. The sample of ASD 
participants was not large (which is true of many studies 
in the field) and so the study was not sufficiently powered 
to detect small/modest between-group differences. Clearly, 
however, the sample was sufficiently powered to detect sig-
nificant between-group differences in metacognitive RTs 
(which were moderate in size; d = 0.65) as well as a sig-
nificant association between the number of ASD traits and 
metacognitive accuracy among TD participants. Thus, while 
it may be that a larger sample would have revealed a deficit 
in metacognitive accuracy among individuals with autism, 
such a deficit would not likely be as marked as the observed 
deficit in metacognitive RTs and, thus, not of clinical sig-
nificance, potentially.
A second explanation for the current findings is that 
wagering accuracy is undiminished in ASD, but under-
pinned by slower processing efficiency in this domain which 
increases the amount of time people with this disorder need 
to make accurate metacognitive judgements. While this is 
a possible explanation for some of the findings, it does not 
appear to explain the results from the correlation analyses 
in Experiment 2. If performance on the wagering task was 
underpinned by the same underlying metarepresentational/
metacognitive resources in each diagnostic group, but just 
resources that are accessed less quickly/efficiently among 
ASD than comparison participants, then associations among 
measures should be of a similar magnitude in each group. 
Yet, this was not the case. Among TD participants, wager-
ing accuracy was associated significantly negatively with 
number of autism traits (r = − .42), but this did not hold up 
among participants with ASD (r = .07). Likewise, wager-
ing reaction time was associated significantly with perfor-
mance on the MASC measure of mindreading among TD 
participants (r = − .73), but not among participants with 
autism (r = −  .19). The different patterns of association 
among measures in each diagnostic group suggests that the 
underlying processing resources used to arrive at accurate 
wagering decisions was different in each group. Therefore, 
we believe that a third explanation is more plausible, namely 
that participants with autism were using alternative, pos-
sibly compensatory, strategies to perform well in terms of 
metacognitive accuracy despite limited underlying metarep-
resentational competence (see Livingston and Happé 2017).
In other domains, it has been shown that individuals with 
autism use alternative strategies to perform well on tasks 
despite possessing atypical underlying conceptual compe-
tence (Bowler 1992; Hermelin and O’Connor 1985). This 
explanation fits well with evidence that adults with autism 
tend to rely on deliberative reasoning strategies to solve 
cognitive tasks, rather than relying on intuitive processes 
employed by TD adults (Brosnan et al. 2016). According 
to Dual-Process theory (Evans and Frankish 2009), human 
decision-making is underpinned by two forms of reason-
ing. Reasoning based on heuristics (non-analytic) tend to 
be fast, easy and intuitive (Type 1) and reasoning based on 
analytic processes tend to be slower, more effortful, and 
deliberative (Type 2). This notion fits well with the cur-
rent findings and may also explain previous findings in the 
literature. Whereas TD adults from the general population 
tend to employ type 1 reasoning when completing metacog-
nitive monitoring tasks, adults with autism tend to employ 
type 2 reasoning, which results in similar levels of accuracy 
but after a longer period of processing. This explains how 
the reliable association between ASD traits and metacogni-
tive accuracy in the general population did not hold in the 
ASD sample in Experiment 2; the association we observed 
was between number of ASD traits and type 1 reasoning 
about one’s confidence. ASD participants in Experiment 2 
were using type 2 processing and this afforded them the 
opportunity to make accurate judgements despite their ASD. 
The previous mixed findings regarding accuracy of verbal 
judgements of confidence among adults with autism could 
also be explained in this way. Under some circumstances, it 
may be that deliberative reasoning about one’s mental states 
yields inaccurate judgements/behaviour (and thus between-
group differences in studies of monitoring accuracy). How-
ever, mostly such reasoning will yield accurate judgements 
(albeit after longer processing) and so between-group dif-
ferences will not be observed. One potentially important 
issue to consider is whether there is a developmental pro-
cess at work also. Intellectually-able adults with ASD have 
already been through an education system that encourages 
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the development of metacognitive skills, so arguably type 
2 reasoning about mental states becomes ingrained as a 
response to training and difficulties with intuitive monitor-
ing earlier in life. In the context of the current study, this 
hypothesis would lead to the prediction that children with 
ASD would show significantly diminished metacognitive 
accuracy on the wagering task. Understanding developmen-
tal processes and not just behavioural outcomes is crucial to 
expanding our understanding of cognitive functioning as a 
whole in ASD. From a theoretical perspective, the current 
results are partly in keeping with the idea that metacogni-
tion and mindreading share metarepresentational process-
ing resources. Specifically, the speed with which one can 
metarepresent self (wagering reaction time) was associated 
specifically with the ability to metarepresent others (on the 
MASC and RMIE). Equally, participants with ASD showed 
impairments in both mindreading and metacognitive pro-
cessing speed, independent of general (object-level) pro-
cessing speed. These findings are consistent with the ideas 
that mindreading and metacognition depend on the same 
underlying metarepresentational resources, and that these 
resources are diminished in ASD causing impairments in 
both domains (e.g., Carruthers 2011; Williams 2010). Con-
trary to expectations, however, (a) wagering accuracy was 
non-significantly associated with mindreading ability, and 
(b) participants with ASD did not show diminished wager-
ing accuracy. We discussed possible reasons for finding 
(b) above. Finding (a) was surprising, because two previ-
ous studies have reported a significant association between 
verbal judgement of confidence accuracy and mindreading 
abilities (Nicholson et al. 2018; Williams et al. 2018), and 
most assume that wagering requires the same underlying 
conceptual resources as judgement of confidence tasks, but 
just a different response mode. Of course, one possibility 
is that wagering accuracy relies on different underlying 
conceptual resources to judgement of confidence accuracy, 
and that only the latter requires metarepresentation (hence, 
only a correlation between judgement of confidence accu-
racy and mindreading task performance, but not between 
wagering accuracy and mindreading task performance). 
While this is possible, it does not explain why wagering 
reaction times were associated with mindreading ability. 
The wagering task must have tapped metarepresentational 
processing in some way, so it does not appear to be the case 
that it is not metarepresentational at all. Another possibility, 
therefore, is that a true underlying association in the cur-
rent study between wagering accuracy and mindreading was 
masked by the different, non-metarepresentational demands 
of the tasks. The fact that the mindreading tasks employed 
in the current study had a verbal response mode, whereas 
the wagering task required only behavioural responses, may 
have influenced results. This idea could be tested in future 
studies by employing verbal and non-verbal measures of 
mindreading and metacognition to investigate whether spe-
cific associations exist between measures that have equiva-
lent response modes.
Overall, the current research provides evidence that 
adults with ASD are just as accurate as TD adults at 
wagering on their perceptual judgements (implying undi-
minished metacognitive monitoring accuracy), albeit only 
with an overall increase in processing time. This is impor-
tant given that metacognitive accuracy can have an impact 
on an individual’s daily functioning (Hacker et al. 2008; 
Nelson and Narens 1990), from basic tasks such as cross-
ing a road to more complex tasks within the work place, 
or even the extent to which a jury will believe a witness 
statement (Cutler et al. 1988).
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